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1LABOUR MARKET IN AN ERA OF ADJUSTMENT: 
A STUDY OF THAILAND
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20-30 years, Thailand has been able to achieve a satisfactory pace of economic 
development. This has come about in spile of several major shocks in the world economy, and structural 
changes in world trade and exchange rate systems. Through out this period, adjustm ent problem s associated 
with short-term  macroeconomic management and external resource gap have been relatively mild com pared to 
the experiences in many other countries. Though the chronic current account deficits and the external debt 
situation became an im portant focus of policy concerns during the early to mid 1980’s, the on-going boom in 
m anufactured exports, starting around 1986, has diluted this concern substantially. The country is now being 
talked about as the leader of the next wave of the Newly Industrialized Countries (N IC’s).
While over all macroeconomic growth has been good, there are im portant structural adjustment 
problems in Thailand concerning sectorial and regional balance, and income distribution. Over the last two 
decades, the disparities between agriculture and non-agriculture, between regions, and between income groups, 
have been widening quite noticeably. While industrialization is now proceeding very rapidly and the share of 
agriculture in G D P is only around 16%, m ore than 60% of the labour force is still primarily engaged in 
agriculture. Most of the dynamic and successful export industries are located in and around the capital city, 
Bangkok, which is highly developed and is about 20 times larger than the next largest city (Chiang Mai). The 
key question for the future is how to maintain the pace of economic growth while ensuring a m ore balanced 
development, with the benefits from development spreading m ore evenly among the population.
In addition, with current rapid growth of industries and services, the composition of dem and for labor 
is changing towards the more highly skilled labor. Currently, there are already shortages of scientific and 
technical manpower at the higher level. In the future, it is expected that the labor m arket for all types of labor 
with middle to high levels of education will also get tight. This will create another structural imbalance, one 
related to labor of different skill types. This may have an adverse impact on the competitiveness of Thailand in 
foreign trade, as well as implications for the strive to achieve a better distribution of income in the future.
The nature and functioning of the labour markets are clearly related to the above problems of 
structural imbalance. Changes in the structure of production lead to changes in the composition of dem and for 
labour; by sector, by location, by skill types. Lags in adjustment in the labour market, or rigidities, will lead to 
structural imbalance in the structure of employment, which may reinforce other imbalances.
Subsequent sections of the study will describe and analyze in detailed the structural adjustments 
problems in Thailand in relation to the structure and functioning of the labour markets.
2. MACROECONOM IC GROWTH AND EXTERNAL BALANCE
Table 1 shows the rates of growth of real G D P from 1960 to 1989. Between 1960 and 1980, the 
average rate of real G D P growth was above 7%, which must be regarded as very satisfactory, breaking down
TABLE 1
GROWTH OF REAL GDP AND REAL PER CAPITA GNP 
(1950-1988)
REAL 
PER CAPITA
YEAR REAL GDP AGRIC INDUSTRY SERVICE GNP
60-65 7.2% 4.8% 11.5% 7.2% __
65-70 8.6% 6.0% 10.4% 9.5% ----
70-75 5.6% 3.8% 7.3% 5.6% 2.9%
75-80 7.9% 4.0% 10.6% 8.2% 5.3%
80-85 5.6% 4.9% 5.0% 6.3% 3.5%
86 4.5% 0.2% 7.1% 4.6% 2.6%
87 8.4% -2.0% 12.0% 10.1% 6.5%
88 11.0% 8.6% 12.8% 10.7% 9.1%
89 10.0 ---- ---- ---- ----
Source: NESDB, National Income of Thailand, various issues. 
Note: Figures from 1970 are based on
the New Series of National Accounts.
3the period from 1960 to 1985 into five year intervals, it can be seen that growth was lowest in the periods in the 
immediate afterm ath of the two oil shocks; 1970-75 and 1980-85. However, the 5.6% average growth achieved 
during these periods is very high when compared to the experiences of other countries. The impact of the first 
oil shock was cushioned by a boom in commodity prices during the same period. This helped to increase farm 
income, and improved the poverty situation considerably.1 In contrast, after the second oil shock, all the main 
agricultural commodities of Thailand suffered a declining price trend. W hile Thailand still m aintained a 
satisfactory rate of growth, the impact on agricultural incomes was very severe, leading to significant increases 
in poverty incidence. However, after 1986, the economy began a period of very rapid growth. Driven on by fast 
growth of m anufactured exports (currently averaging 30-40% per annum), as well as tourism, economic growth 
reached 11% in 1988, was about 10% last year, and is likely to be at the double digit level again this year.
As with most LDC’s, Thailand has usually experiences trade and current account deficit during the 
course of its development. In 1975, the ratio of the stock of debt to G D P was insignificant at 2.3%. Since 1975, 
however, this ratio rose rapidly. The ratio jum ped to 16.1% of G D P in 1980, and to 39.0% of G D P in 1985 (See 
Figure 1). A fter the second oil shock, as a result of the recession in the world economy and declining 
agricultural commodity prices, the ratio of debt to G D P increased particularly rapidly, and also from a fairly 
base. In the early to mid-1980’s, this was an issue of major concern to the government.
During the period after the second oil shock, the Thai government, both at its own initiative and also 
with assistance from the IM F and the W orld Bank, carried out various structural adjustm ent policies in order to 
control the external imbalance and associated foreign debt problems.2 There were some restructuring of taxes, 
particularly the progressive reduction and finally elimination of the export tax on rice. A ttem pts were made to 
control public expenditures, and major policy along this line which had im portant consequences on the 
employment situation was the ceiling on government employment growth to 2% per annum, starting around 
1983. This significantly affected the employment prospects of the better educated workers, who are 
predominantly employed by the public sector. However, the policies that were politically the most difficult to 
put through were probably the two devaluations, in 1981 and 1984. In 1981, the Baht was devalued from about 
20.5/dollar to 23/dollar, and in 1984 a further devaluation took the rate to about 27/dollar. In both cases, the 
government nearly fell. In contrast, there were hardly any political concerns after 1986 when the baht was tied 
mostly to the US dollar as the dollar depreciated substantially relative to the yen and other major European 
currencies, which m eant substantial effective depreciation of the baht with respect to average currency of 
Thailand’s trading partners. These devaluations and depreciation of the baht were in fact quite substantial 
departures from the exchange rate policies that had been followed for a long time. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
the bah t/do llar exchange rate had moved very little in the thirty years between 1950 and 1980.
W hile the various adjustment policies did not keep the ratio of foreign to G D P from rising, they 
nevertheless kept the problem from getting out of hand. This left Thailand in a good position to take advantage 
of changes that occurred in the world economic environment starting around 1986. Partly because of the 
exchange rate adjustments, partly because of the sharp decline in oil prices in 1986, and also partly because of 
the transition of the current Asian NIC’s (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) to m ore skilled and 
technologically intensive export products, the growth of the Thai economy accelerated significantly after 1986. 
The growth was mainly driven on by sharp increases in manufactured exports, which started to grow at a rate of 
about 30-40% per annum since 1986. These exports are very diverse covering such products as processed food, 
textiles, shoes, gems and jewellery, artificial flowers, integrated circuits, toys, and steel pipes. Basically, these 
products are of the low to semi-skilled types, and are the items through which the current N IC’s had previous
1. See below.
2. For discussions and details o f the various structural adjustment policies that were carried out during this period see Sahasakul, 
Thongpakde and Kraisoraphong [1989].
4achieved their success. At the 
same time, however, Thailand 
still remains a major player in 
agricultural exports. She is the 
largest exporter of rice and 
cassava in the world, and ranks 
among the top five to ten in 
exports of rubber, sugarcane, 
maize and fisheries.
The boom in exports 
led to a downturn in the ratio 
of debt to GDP, which declined 
from about 39% in 1986 to only 
about 32% in 1988 (Figure 1).
W hile currently, the external 
resource gap is starting to 
widen again in absolute terms, 
it remains manageable thanks 
partly to the huge inflow of 
foreign direct investment into 
the country. The key 
macroeconomic issue has 
shifted m ore to the question of how to manage the extremely rapid industrial and urban growth.
3. STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE AND ADJUSTMENT
Although Thailand has been able to achieve a very satisfactory pace of economic growth over the past 
two to three decades, and short-run adjustment problems have proved to be relatively minor, there are 
nevertheless im portant problems concerning sectorial and locational imbalance and income distribution. 
Disparities between sectors of productions, between regions, and between income groups have been widening.
The importance of agriculture in GDP has continually been on the decline. In 1960, the share of 
agriculture in G D P was about 40%. This declined to 31.5% in 1975, and between 1975 and 1986, the share fell 
by almost half to about 16.7% (see Table 2). With the declining importance of agriculture in GD P, it is not 
surprising that the share of employment in agriculture has also been declining. However, the decline in the 
share of employment in agriculture has been at a much slower pace than that for the share of agriculture in 
value added. While the share of agriculture in G D P nearly halved between 1975 and 1986, the share of 
employment in agricultural3 only fell from 73% to 67%. This obviously m eant a substantial widening of the 
ratio of value-added per head between non-agriculture and agriculture. In 1975, the value added per head in 
non-agriculture was 5.9 times higher than that in agriculture. By 1986, it was 10 times higher.
The widening gap between non-agriculture and agriculture was particularly rapid between 1980 and 
1986. During this period, the prices of most of the major crops were on a downward trend. The export price of
3. This refers to the share o f the workforce who have their main occupation in agriculture, and is based on data during the peak 
agricultural season.
5TABLE 2
GDP AND EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR
YEAR 1975 1980 1986
GDP (MILLIONS OF BAHT) 298,816 684,930 1,098,362
AGRICULTURE 94,063 173,806 183,037
NON-AGRICULTURE 204,753 511,124 915,325
SHARE
AGRICULTURE 31.48% 25.38% 16.66%
NON-AGRICULTURE 68.52% 74.62% 83.34%
EMPLOYMENT (MILLIONS) 18.182 22.681 26.672
AGRICULTURE 13.270 16.092 17.803
NON-AGRICULTURE 4.912 6.589 8.870
SHARE
AGRICULTURE 72.99% 70.95% 66.75%
NON-AGRICULTURE 27.01% 29.05% 33.25%
PER CAPITA GDP (BAHT/MONTH) 1,369.6 2,516.6 3,431.7
AGRICULTURE 590.7 900.1 856.8
NON-AGRICULTURE 3,474.0 6,464.7 8,599.9
RATIO NON-AG/AG 5.88 7.18 10.04
Source: NESDB, National Income of Thailand, and
NSO, Labour Force Surveys, various issues.
TABLE 3 
MEAN PER CAPITA INCOME 
AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
(BAHT PER MONTH)
YEAR AGRIC NON-AGRIC RATIO NON-AG/AG
1975/6 247 513 2.08
1981 503 1,154 2.29
1986 481 1,312 2.73
Source: NSO, Socioeconomic Surveys, 1975/6, 1981 and 1986
6rice declined on average by 7% per annum, that of rubber by 5.1% per annum and that of sugar by 9.1% per 
annum. The result was that the per capita G D P in agriculture actually declined in absolute term s (Table 2).
Because most agricultural households earn a significant part of their income from non-agricultural 
activities,4 the disparity in per capita income between agricultural and non-agricultural households is not as 
large as the disparity in per capita GDP. Nevertheless, the difference is about two times, and has been widening 
along with the trend in per capita GDP. Table 3 shows that in 1975/6, the ratio of per capita income of non- 
agricultural households to that of agricultural households was 2.1. This increased to 2.7 in 1986. Also, during 
the period from 1981 to 1986, when crop prices were on a downward trend, nominal per capita income of 
agricultural households fell.
The disparity between agriculture and non-agriculture was obviously reflected in the disparity 
between the urban and rural areas. However, in the case of Thailand, the extrem e primacy of the capital city, 
Bangkok, leads to big differences between the economic conditions in Bangkok and the rest of the country. 
W hereas the Bangkok region5 contains 15.6% of the total population in 1985, it accounted for 45.5% of total 
GDP. 63.7% of the G D P from industry originates from the capital region. For the most dynamic exporting 
industries such as textiles and garments, the proportions originating from the Bangkok region rise to over 90%. 
Per capita G D P in Bangkok was m ore than 7 times higher than that for the Northeast (the poorest region), and 
was about 2.8 times higher than that for the Central region (the second richest region). In fact, taken by itself, 
the Bangkok region is already a NIC.
The sectorial and region disparities are reflected in the distribution of household income. Table 4 
shows the shares of incomes received by various quintiles of households, with the top and bottom  two deciles 
also separated out. Between 1975 and 1986, the income share of the richest 20% of households increased from 
49.3% to 55.6%, while that of the poorest 20% of households declined from 6.0% to 4.5%. The shares of all 
quintile below the top quintile continually declined between 1975/6 and 1986. In fact, looking at the top two 
deciles, it can be seen that the second decile only made a slight gain. It was the top decile that increased its 
share of income substantially.
Between 1981 and 1986, apart from the worsening in the distribution of income, absolute poverty also 
increased. Because most of the population depended for their livelihood on agriculture, the decline in crop 
prices led to a large increase in the share of population living below the poverty line from 23% in 1981 to 29.5% 
in 1986 (see Table 5). As can be seen from the Table, this was a reversal of the excellent progress made in 
poverty alleviation since the late 1960’s. In 1968/9, the percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line was 39%. This declined to only 23% in 1981, before increasing back rapidly to 29.5% in 1986.
A fter 1986, agricultural prices picked up substantially. This helped to reduce the poverty. The 
percentage of the population living below the poverty line declined to 25.2% in 1988. This was, however, still 
higher than the ratio under the poverty line in 1981. The income distribution situation since 1986 still shows a 
slight worsening trend. Although crop prices increased, the boom in m anufactured exports also led to rapid 
increases in incomes of those in the urban areas, and particularly those in and around Bangkok, because most 
of the industries are located in such areas.
The worsening trend of poverty and income distribution between 1981 and 1986 were counteracted to 
some extent by the exchange rate policy discussed earlier, and also by the agricultural taxation policy.
4. In 1987, it was estimated that the agricultural households earned about 46% of their income from non-agricultural sources; see 
Sussangkam, Tinakom  and Chongpeerapien [1988], table 5.6.
5. Including the 5 surrounding provinces.
7TABLE 4
INCOME SHARE BY QUINTILE GROUPS OF POPULATION 
(PERCENT OF TOTAL)
QUINTILE 1975/6 1981 1986
1st 49.3 51.5 55.6
- top 10% 33.4 35.4 39.1
- second 10% 15.9 16.1 16.5
2nd 21.0 20.6 19.9
3rd 14.0 13.4 12.1
4 th 9.7 9.1 7.9
5 th 6.0 5.4 4.5
- second bottom 10% 3.6 3.3 2.7
- bottom 10% 2.4 2.1 1.8
Source: NSO, Socioeconomic Surveys 1975/6, 1981 and 1985/6.
TABLE 5 
POVERTY INCIDENCE 
(PERCENT POPULATION BELOW POVERTY LINE)
Whole Kingdom
1968/9 39.00
1975/6 30.02
1981 23.04
1986 29.51
1988 25.16
Source : Meesook [1979] and Hutaserani and Jitsuchon [1988].
Note : Figures up to 1986 are calculated from various Socioeconomic 
Surveys conducted by the NSO. 1988 figure was based on a TDRI 
simulation using the THAM2 model. Sanitary districts are classified as 
rural.
8Devaluations in 1981 and 1984 generally led to increases in farm incomes com pared to what they would have 
been without these devaluations. Although Thailand does have some m arket power in the major export crops 
such as paddy, econometric estimates generally find the foreign dem and curve to be fairly elastic, and that 
devaluation would increase domestic farm incomes. Thailand has also had a long history of export taxation on 
rice.6 This included export tax, rice premium and export quotas on rice exports. It has been estim ated to imply 
a burden on the rice farm ers verging on 30% of the foreign price of rice in 1980.7 As rice prices fell on the 
world market, the rate of taxation gradually declined, and in 1986 all taxation on rice exports (explicit and 
implicit) were removed. This helped to keep domestic farm gate price from falling in line with world prices. 
Nevertheless, these policies could not reverse the trend of falling farm incomes and worsening inequality.
The problems of imbalance, poverty, and income distribution described above are clearly related to 
adjustments occurring in labour markets in response to structural changes on the production side. The next 
section will discuss the structure of the labour market in Thailand, and the relationship between the labour 
market and the structural imbalance and disparity issues outlined above.
4. LABOUR MARKETS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS
4.1 General Employment Situation
As mentioned above and indicated in Table 2, most of those employed in Thailand have their 
livelihood in agriculture. Currently, over 65% of all employed individuals have their main occupation in 
agriculture. Thus, in terms of the employment structure, Thailand is basically an agrarian society. As far as the 
employment situation is concerned, aggregate indicators do not reveal any serious employment problems.
Open unemployment are generally very low, ranging around 1% of the workforce, although the rate appears to 
be on the rise (Figure 3), 
presumably partly due to the 
recession in the first part of the 
1980’s. The low open 
unemployment rates is not too 
surprising. M ost people in 
Thailand work as either own- 
account or unpaid family 
workers, and mainly in 
agriculture. While the share of 
the own-account and unpaid 
family workers in total 
employment has been 
gradually falling (Table 6), in 
1988 they still account for over 
70% of all employed people.
Thus, it is easy for most people 
to work for the family 
enterprise. Also, as with many 
other LD C’s, there are many 
informal sector employment
6. There are also smaller taxes on 
rubber, which is still present today.
7. See Siamwalla and Setboonsam g [1987],
 gp----------------------------------------
OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
PERCENT OPEN UNEMPLOYED
Figure 3
TABLE 6
EMPLOYMENT BY WORKSTATUS: 1978- 88
1978 1983 1988
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 1,020,528 1,780,834 1,839,900
PRIVATE EMPLOYEES 3,291,002 4,470,462 6,176,700
EMPLOYER 282,424 253,586 353,500
OWN-ACCOUNT 6,544,122 7,456,259 8,550,600
UNPAID 10,669,761 11,222,386 12,543,300
TOTAL 21,807,837 25,183,527 29,464,000
SHARES
1978 1983 1988
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 4.68% 7.07% 6.24%
PRIVATE EMPLOYEES 15.09% 17.75% 20.96%
EMPLOYER 1.30% 1.01% 1.20%
OWN-ACCOUNT 30.01% 29.61% 29.02%
UNPAID 48.93% 44.56% 42.57%
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: NSO, Labour Force Surveys, July-September.
TABLE 7
PERCENT OF EMPLOYED WORKING LESS THAN 
20 HOURS PER WEEK 
(JULY-SEPTEMBER)
1977 1984
NORTH
MUNI 1.69 0.65
NON-MUNI 1.63 1.55
NORTHEAST
MUNI 2.05 1.57
NON-MUNI 6.2 0.65
SOUTH
MUNI 3.8 0.94
NON-MUNI 7.49 3.49
CENTRAL
MUNI 1.7 0.96
NON-MUNI 1.95 1.22
BANGKOK 1.07 0.76
WHOLE KINGDOM 3.97 1.27
Source: NSO, Labour Force Surveys, 1977 and 1984.
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opportunities available, where barriers to entry are low, so that most of those who really want to work can find 
something to do.
Underem ploym ent has also been generally low in Thailand. Table 7 shows that in 1977, about 4%  of 
the employed workforce worked less than 20 hours per week. This percentage declined to on 1.3% in 1984. 
There were regional variations, but in no region was there a really serious problem of underem ploym ent. The 
underemployed are almost equally divided between males and females, and over 80% of the underem ployed are 
own-account workers or unpaid family workers. In fact, when asked whether they desired m ore work, about 
64% of the underemployed stated that they did not want more work.8
4.2 Labour M arket Problems and Structural Adjustment
There are 3 basic types of adjustment problems concerning the labour market.
a. The first is a short-term  problem related to the seasonal nature of agricultural
production. In the dry season, there is a lack of agricultural activities in non­
irrigated parts of the country, and a very high proportion of the labour force 
becomes seasonally unemployed.
b. Problems concerning lags in labour movement in line with changes in the
production structure. This leads to problems concerning sectorial and 
locational disparities.
c. Problems of mismatching of supply and demand by educational types. This is
mostly relevant to the middle to upper educational levels.
A . Seasonal Unemployment
As most of those employed are dependent on agriculture, and work in agriculture has a seasonal 
nature, it is found that seasonal unemployment is a problem that afflicts a great num ber of people. Table 8 
shows that between 3-5 millions people are seasonally unemployed each year.9 The area worse afflicted is the 
Northeast, the poorest region, where over 30% of the workforce are seasonally unemployed. A bout 40% of the 
seasonally unemployed are own-account workers, who own their own farm, and who may not have real 
opportunities to find off-farm work during the dry season, particularly if this has to involve seasonal migration. 
O f the rest, most are unpaid family workers, and consists of the relatively young (14-24 years old), and also a 
large num ber of females.
A  study by Bertrand and Squire [1980] suggested that most of the seasonally unemployed are 
voluntarily unemployed, with the younger workers and females drawn into the labour force to help in the peak 
season, and they voluntarily withdraw in the dry season. However, m ore recent examinations by Phongpaichit 
and Baker [1984] and Sussangkarn [1987] contradicted this view. The latter analyzed a special data set on 
seasonal migration and showed that most of the seasonal unemployed would like to find work in the dry 
seasons, and this was particularly true of the groups of the younger workers and the females. Many, however, 
are unable to find jobs, or do not know how to go about looking for seasonal migration jobs.
8. According to the Labour Force Survey, Juiy-September 1984.
9. Recently, the numbers o f seasonally unemployed have declined to around 3 millions each year.
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TABLE 8
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT NUMBERS AND RATES 
(1977-1985)
LABOUR FORCE SU RVEY 19 77  ROUND 1
NORTH NORTH-EAST SOUTH CENTRAL
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 1 .0 6 5 .7 4 0  2 .3 0 6 .9 1 0  5 3 .6 6 0
SEASONAL RATE 2 4 .5 1 %  3 0 .3 2 %  2 .3 4 %
5 3 7 .3 1 0  3 .9 6 3 .6 2 0
1 3 .78%  2 1 .8 4 %
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 1978 ROLND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
8 6 3 .9 3 0  2 .6 7 3 .8 7 0
19 .55%  3 5 .2 0 %
3 8 .8 5 0  4 4 5 ,4 1 0  4 .0 2 2 .0 6 0
1.54%  1 1 .09%  2 1 .6 8 %
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 1979 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
9 8 5 .5 7 0  2 .8 2 3 .7 8 0  1 2 8 .0 8 0  4 3 1 .8 9 0  4 .3 6 9 .3 2 0
2 1 .6 0 %  3 6 .1 8 %  5 .3 8 %  1 0 .86%  2 3 .3 4 %
LABOUR FORCE SU RVEY 1981 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
1 .4 9 7 .2 0 0  3 .2 7 4 .9 7 0
2 8 .9 8 %  3 9 .4 8 %
4 8 .4 4 0
3 .01%
TOTAL 
7 4 9 .9 8 0  5 .5 7 0 .5 9 0
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 1982 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
1 .4 8 2 .0 3 0  3 .4 4 2 .9 1 0
2 7 .3 5 %  4 0 .1 3 %
TOTAL
7 1 .4 7 0  4 6 0 .6 2 0  5 .4 5 7 .0 3 0
2 .5 7 %  9 .7 5 %  2 5 .3 8 %
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 1983 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
9 9 2 .4 2 0  2 .7 7 5 .2 2 0
2 0 .0 5 %  3 5 .9 0 %
TOTAL
7 5 .3 2 0  5 7 3 .8 1 0  4 .4 1 6 .7 7 0
2 89% 1 3 .0 0 %  2 2 .4 2 %
LABOUR FORCE SU RVEY 1984 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
6 7 5 .4 1 0  2 .7 7 0 .2 7 0
12.79%  3 3 .2 6 %
TOTAL
7 7 .8 8 0  2 4 4 .0 2 0  3 .7 6 7 .5 8 0
2 .8 7 %  5 .3 7 %  18 .05%
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 1985 ROUND 1
SEASONAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
SEASONAL RATE
9 4 6 .6 8 0  2 ,7 7 1 .8 2 0
17 .41%  3 1 .47%
TOTAL
1 2 1 ,3 9 0  3 4 8 .6 2 0  4 .1 8 8 .5 1 0
4 .2 9 %  7 .2 4 %  19 .14%
SOURCE: L a b o u r F o rc e  s u r v e y s .  NSO.
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TABLE 9 
AGRICULTURAL INDICATORS 
(SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES)
COUNTRY
(a) (b) 
PERCENT 
LAB.FORCE 
IN AGRIC 
(1980)
AGRIC 
SHARE 
IN GDP 
(1982)
RATIO
(b/a)
BANGLADESH 75 47 .63
BURMA 53 48 .90
CHINA 74 37 .50
INDIA 70 33 .47
INDONESIA 57 26 .46
KOREA,REP 36 16 .44
MALAYSIA 23 23 1.00
PAKISTAN 55 31 .56
PHILIPPINES 52 22 .42
SRI LANKA 53 27 .51
THAILAND 71 22 .28
Source: IBRD World Development Report, various issues.
Because of the sizable nature of the seasonal unemployment problem, it is an im portant problem for 
the rural population. The problem is, however, intrinsically tied to the seasonal nature of agricultural activities. 
The situation will depend on changes in the cropping pattern in agriculture, as different crops require different 
amounts of labour at various times of the year. It will also depend on possibilities for further extending 
irrigation into currently rain-fed areas.
B. Labour Movement and Changing Production Structure
As earlier discussed, an important adjustment problem is the lack of balance between the sectorial 
and location distribution of production and of employment. This has led to growing disparities between 
agriculture and non-agriculture and between regions in the country. The case of Thailand seems somewhat 
unusual when compared to other countries. Comparing the ratio of the share of employment in agriculture to 
the share of agriculture in G D P for a number of countries, Thailand stands out as having one of the highest 
ratio (Table 9). This ratio indicates the difference between the value added per head in agriculture and non­
agriculture, as is a rough indicator of the disparity between agriculture and non-agriculture.
Part of the explanation for the very large ratio of the share of employment in agriculture to the share 
of agriculture in G D P may be because many of those who have their main occupations in agriculture also work
13
in non-agricultural occupations through out the year, particularly in the off-season.10 W hile this may be true to 
some extent, it is unlikely to be the main explanation of the very high ratio in Thailand com pared to other 
countries. First, those engaged in agriculture in other countries are also likely to be engaged in non-agricultural 
occupations as well. Second, the availability of non-agricultural opportunities are not abundant everywhere, as 
evidenced by severe seasonal unemployment problems in many parts of the country. Further, the comparison 
of incomes of agricultural and non-agricultural households in Table 3 above includes household incomes from 
all sources, and this shows agricultural households falling behind non-agricultural household in line with 
widening value added per head between agriculture and non-agriculture.
There appears to be two main reasons why there is such a difference between the ratio of 
employment in agriculture and the share of agriculture in G D P in Thailand. The first is the past ready 
availability of forest areas which could be converted to arable land. This was the main destination for migrants 
from the rural areas in response to the population pressure up until about 1980. Instead of migrating to the 
urban areas, rural migrants would go to the forest areas (often illegally), and settled down to cultivate the land, 
and in effect took ownership. The main migration pattern in the 60’s and 70’s was rural-rural. As a result one 
found that up until the late 1970’s, the rate of expansion of cultivated area in Thailand was between 3-4% per 
annum (Figure 4), and was in fact greater than the rate of population growth in the rural areas. The land/m an 
ratio in agriculture had actually been increasing up until the late 1970’s.
A second reason is 
the very high proportion of 
farm households who are 
owner cultivators in Thailand.
In 1981, data from the 
socioeconomic survey give the 
proportion as 83.3% of all farm 
households.11 This is likely to 
be a factor working against 
large scale migration into the 
urban areas. It is likely that 
the m arket for the sales and 
purchases of land in the rural 
areas is thin, and thus owner 
cultivators who wish to sell 
their land and migrate to the 
urban areas may only get 
rather low prices for their land.
This would increase the 
opportunity cost of migration.
M igration from self-cultivating 
households would therefore be 
limited to a few family members such as sons or daughters, and may be circulatory in nature, rather than a 
wholesale movement of all the family members.
TOTAL CULTIVATED AREAS OF MAJOR CROPS 
(Excluding Rubber and Second Rice Crop)
Year
Figure 4
10. This was already indicated above.
11. NSO, Socioeconomic Survey 1981.
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A factor which would reinforce the above reason is that many of the so called owner cultivator in 
fact do not have full land titles. The migrants who went into the forest areas to open up new land were actually 
taking possession of the land illegally. They went into the reserved forest areas, while the authorities did not 
really try to enforce the law. The result is that about 30% of private land in Thailand have no formal legal 
documents. This will make it even m ore costly for a farm er to abandon the land and m igrate out off the rural 
areas.12
U p until about the end of the 1970’s, it was logical that many farm ers migrated to open up new 
agricultural land. Plenty of land were still available in the forest areas.13 Further, crop prices were high and 
rising. The rural-rural migration path was probably the best choice for the rural population. First, once they 
migrated, they end up doing the thing they know how to do well, i.e. agricultural cultivation. Second, the move 
also appeared to increase their asset, because it seem that they have possession of the land.
The problem is that once crop prices started to decline in the early 1980’s, it was difficult for the 
farmers to move out off agriculture. Those who legally own their land may face large opportunity costs in 
selling their land and moving to the urban areas, due to the thin land m arket. Those who have no legal title to 
the land will get even lower prices for their land, and hence face a very high opportunity cost.
The high opportunity 
cost faced by the farmers were 
they to migrate into the urban 
areas leads to long lags in the 
adjustment of the employment 
structure to the production 
structure. However, some 
adjustments have been 
occurring, and the pace of 
adjustment is likely to be 
accelerating, given the rapid 
industrialization that is taking 
place in Thailand at the 
present time. The benefits to 
be had in migrating to the 
urban areas where there are 
rapidly growing demand for 
semi-skilled workers are 
getting larger and larger. D ata 
on the rate of growth of the 
urban population show clearly 
that rural-urban migration has 
been increasing since 1980. Between 1960 and 1980, the growth of the urban population has been rem arkably 
steady at about 3.5% per annum. Between 1980 and 1985 however, the rate jum ped to 6.6% per annum (Figure 
5). This was the time when crop prices were falling, and also when the availability of new land for agricultural 
expansion became very limited. Thus, there are clearly labour market responses to changes on the production
GROWTH PER ANNUM OF URBAN POPULATION 
( 1 9 6 0 -1 9 8 5 )
6.6
3.4 3.5
6 0 -65  6 5 -70  7 0 -7 5  7 5 -8 0  8 0 -8 5
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Figure 5
12. For an analysis o f the impact land titles see Chalamwong and Feder [1988],
13. Subject to non-enforcement by the authorities.
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side. However, the responses could not keep pace with changes that were occurring in the production structure. 
This led to problems of imbalances and income disparities discussed earlier.
The current industrial boom will likely lead to even m ore rapid urban growth. While reason 
migration data are not very complete,14 it is likely that migration rates into areas in and around Bangkok have 
accelerated. If Thailand can maintain the pace of growth anywhere resembling the past pattern of growth 
experiences by the Asian NIC’s, population movements out off agriculture and into the urban areas are likely to 
be the key demographic transition over the medium to long term  in Thailand.
C. Dem and Supply Mismatching o f Educated Manpower
W hile the over all open unemployment rate in Thailand is very low, generally the rates of educated 
open unemployment are quite high, particularly at the vocational level. This was an im portant problem around 
the mid 1980’s, and was related to the cutback in government employment growth to 2%  per annum  as 
indicated earlier. Currently, however, due to the economic boom, the problem of educated open 
unemployment is much less severe, and instead the problem of shortages of engineering and scientific 
manpower has become important. These problems of mismatching of dem and and supply of educated 
manpower relates to structural changes on the demand side, the functioning of the labour m arket, and the 
education system.
Table 10 shows that the open unemployment rate of those with primary education or below was 
about half of a percent in 1984 and 1986. At the vocational level, however, the rate was over 10% in both years. 
A t the other levels, the rates were around 3-4%. U p until the economic boom  which started after 1986, the 
num ber of educated openly unemployed had been increasing rapidly. The two groups with the highest growth 
of open unemployment were those with university education (averaging 14.3% per annum between 1977 and 
1986), and vocational education (averaging 22.7% per annum), which was the group with the most serious open 
unemployment problem. It had the highest open unemployment rate, and also the fastest growth in the 
num bers openly unemployed. In 1986, the number of unemployed with vocational education was about equal to 
the sum of the unemployed with secondary, university, and teacher training combined.
There were four basic reasons why the educated open unemployment problem has been getting 
worse over the first part of the 1980’s. First, the supply of the better educated workforce had been rising 
rapidly. Since 1980, workers with university and vocational education have been increasing at about 15% per 
annum. This was much faster than the overall growth in the labour force. Social dem and for education at the 
higher levels had been growing rapidly.
Second, there was a fundamental change in the main source of dem and for the better educated 
workers. U p until about 1983-4, the main absorber of the better educated workers was the public sector.
Figure 6 shows the importance of the government for the employment of the better educated (based on 1984 
data). For those with less than completed primary education (Pratom  4), the proportion in government 
employment was only about half of a percent. For completed primary education, the proportion was still low at 
2.1%. The importance of the public sector increased rapidly for higher levels of education. 22.1% of all 
workers with secondary education were employed by the government. This increased to 41.4% for vocational 
education, 56.3% for university education, and 84% for teachers.15
14. This will have to wait for the 1990 Census.
15. The latter is not very surprising, as the government is the main source o f supply o f education.
TABLE 10
OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY EDUCATION: 1984-1988
1984 1986 1988
PRIMARY AND BELOW 0.42% 0.56% 0.38%
SECONDARY 3.19% 3.55% 2.47%
VOCATIONAL 10.22% 10.86% 5.31%
UNIVERSITY 4.19% 4.58% 2.87%
TEACHER TRAINING 3.19% 3.96% 1.62%
TOTAL 0.97% 1.26% 0.83%
Source: NSO, Labour Force Surveys, July-September.
SHARE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT 
BY EDUCATION: 1984
20 40 60 80
PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
100
Figure 6
17
From  the mid 1970’s to about 1984, government employment growth am ounted to about 10% per 
annum. This was faster than the growth in the size of the private employees, or the num bers of own-account 
and unpaid family workers. The high government employment growth created much needed jobs for the 
rapidly increasing pool of workers with relatively high levels of education. While this did not slow down the 
growth in educated open unemployment completely, it helped to contain the problem substantially. However, 
as part of the structural adjustment policies taken in the early part of the 1980’s, in about 1983-4, there was a 
dram atic cutback in the growth of government employment to only 2% per annum. As discussed in section 2, 
the early to mid 80’s was a period when the saving-investment gap and the rapidly rising foreign debt burden 
were im portant issues for Thailand. As civil service salaries were taking up more and m ore of the budget,16 the 
government had to control the rise in this expenditure item, and therefore imposed an upper limit on civil 
service growth to 2%  per annum, a limit which is still in existence for most parts of the civil service today. The 
consequence was that the educated workers could no longer rely on the public sector as the main absorber of 
the supply.
The third reason for rising open educated unemployment is that the education system cannot respond 
quickly to changing needs in the labour market. The skill mix required by the civil service was very different to 
that required for private sector employment. Even with the current economic boom, there is an over supply of 
graduates in the humanities, social and political sciences, while at the same time there is a severe shortage in 
the m ore technical and scientific disciplines (see below). The education system is mostly public and highly 
bureaucratic, and it is very difficult to reduce the size of any departm ent even though there are clear needs to 
reallocate resources among disciplines to keep up with changing labour market needs.
The fourth reason has to do with the structure of the labour market. Previous analyses of the labour 
m arket points to the existence of labour market segmentation, with wages not fully responsive to dem and and 
supply (Sussangkarn [1987]).
Relative wage data by 
educational levels (Figure 7) 
did not reveal any clear falling 
trend in the relative wage of 
the vocational and university 
groups, even though their open 
unemployment rates had been 
rising most rapidly.
Econom etric estimations of a 
segm ented labour market 
model revealed high wage 
differentials betw een the 
"formal" sector, consisting of 
the public sector and the large 
private firms, and the "informal 
sector", and the better 
educated find it m ore 
worthwhile to  be unemployed 
and wait for an opening in the 
formal sector ra ther than go 
and work in the informal 
sector.
RELATIVE WAGE BY EDUCATION: 1 9 7 8 - 8 4  
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16. In 1984, almost 48% o f all government revenues had to be used to the pay salaries of civil servants.
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The above study found that returns to education above the primary level were zero or almost zero in 
the inform al sector, while there were large returns to education in the formal sector. Thus, the wage 
differential between the formal and informal sector increased with the level of education. For a male non­
migrant private employee in Bangkok age 35 years old, the estimates predicted a small formal-informal wage 
differential at the primary educational level. This differential rose to over 400% for those with university 
education.
Given the high formal-informal wage differential for the better educated, they find it worthwhile to 
wait for an opening in the formal sector rather than go and work in the informal sector. O f course, some may 
go and work in the informal sector. However, many may look down on the work in the informal sector as being 
of low status. In fact, as the level of education increased the proportion found in formal sector employment also 
went up quickly. In 1988 it was estimated that for those with primary education and below, only 6.6% worked in 
the formal sector. The ratio quickly rose to 31.6% and 35.5% for those with lower and upper secondary 
education. For those with vocational education, it was 63.2%, and the ratio reached 88.4% for those with 
university education. Further, most of the educated unemployed came from relatively well off families, who 
could finance their periods of unemployment.
Recently, with the economy experiencing double digit growths, the situation in the labour m arket is 
changing rapidly. As seen in Table 10, by 1988 the open unemployment problem for the better educated had 
improved tremendously. The open unemployment rate of the vocational group had almost halved from the rate 
in 1986. A  different type of problem has emerged. There is now a severe shortage of scientific and technical 
manpower (especially engineers) at the bachelor degree level and above (see Table 11 for estimates at the 
bachelor degree level). Wages of these types of workers have increased rapidly. The larger private firms are 
bidding workers away from the public sector, and the small and medium size private firms. The situation is 
unlikely to get better for some time, given the continual increase in foreign direct investment from countries 
such as Japan, H ong Kong, and Taiwan.
A t the vocational level, however, the technical manpower situation is still one with general excess 
supply, although there are shortages in specific industrial fields. Part of the reason is that many of the booming 
industries appear to rely m ore on semi-skilled workers with general training. A nother reason is the quality of 
output at the vocational level. There are insufficient coordination between the vocational schools, which are 
mostly public, and the private companies. The machineries that are used to teach vocational students are 
mostly outdated, and the schools do not have enough resources to update the equipm ent to keep up with the 
rapidly changing industrial and technical structures.
5. ADJUSTMENT ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The policy focus for the future should be to maintain the pace of economic growth while ensuring 
better sharing of the benefits from growth among the population. In order to reach this goal, several problems 
concerning human resources and the labour m arket have to be tackled in line with expected changes in the 
production structure.
1. The expected rapid growth in rural-urban migration has to be anticipated and planned. Already 
Bangkok is highly congested, and the necessary infrastructures lag far behind the real needs. Currently, the 
Eastern  Seaboard region appears to be developing rapidly. This will help to divert some of the industrial
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TABLE 11
PROJECTED EXCESS SUPPLY OF ENGINEERS BY FIELDS
(PERSON)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1996
BACHELOR DEGREE
El (78) (80) (61) (39) 91
E2 (515) (541) (428) (326) 391
TOTAL E (593) (622) (489) (366) 482
Ml (1,285) (1,400) (1,277) (1,279) (1,277)
M2 23 36 59 84 245
TOTAL M (1,262) (1,364) (1,217) (1,195) (1,032)
Tl (88) (156) 131 365 1,386
T2 (225) (245) (227) (218) (185)
T3 (346) (430) (411) (429) (526)
TOTAL T (659) (831) (507) (282) 674
Source: TDRI/NESDB (1989).
Note: Meanings of the Codes
E. Electronics Technology El
E2
M. Material Technology Ml
M2
T. Related Technology Tl
T2
T3
- Computer science, including
computer engineering.
- Electrical engineering,
including electrical, electronic 
and communications engineering.
- Mechanical engineering.
- Metallurgy, including material
science and mining engineering.
- Other engineering, including
civil engineering, sanitary 
engineering, survey engineering, 
agriculture and irrigation 
engineering, and other 
engineering disciplines not 
covered under E, M, T2 or T3.
- Chemical engineering.
- Industrial engineering.
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expansion and population movement away from the surrounding areas of Bangkok.17 The urban centers in the 
Eastern  Seaboard region needs careful management and planning, however. O ne does not want to repeat the 
chaos and congestion in Bangkok at the Eastern Seaboard area. Already, the social infrastructures (schools, 
hospitals, etc.) are lagging the population movement into the Eastern Seaboard region.
2. W hereas Thailand has a ready supply of relatively cheap labour available, and this will rem ain so 
for sometime, most of these workers have just primary education. In Thailand, m ore than half of those who 
finished the 6 years of compulsory education drop out off the formal education system. Currently, 75% of the 
workforce have just primary education. The gross enrollment ratio at the secondary level is only 30%. This is 
very low when com pared to the Asian NIC’s, and also lower than many countries in the region, who are likely to 
be Thailand’s main competitors in the future (Figure 8).
17. The Eastern Seaboard region is and area between Chonburi and Rayong, which are located between 100-200 kilometers from 
Bangkok.
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For the future, Thailand needs to upgrade the technological and skill base of its industries and 
services.18 This will require workers with more than just primary education. Recent evidence indicated that the 
m ore m odern m anufacturing industries, which are behind the current accelerated growth, dem and m ore and 
m ore workers with more than just primary education. Because of the low enrollm ent at the secondary level, it 
is likely that the m arket for workers with m ore than primary education will begin to get tight over the next few 
years. W hen this happens, the basic wages of the modern manufacturing sector will begin to rise rapidly, and 
Thailand’s competitiveness will be eroded. This will happen in spite of the fact that Thailand will still have a 
large pool of low wage, and low income workers with just primary education. Such a development may affect 
both the sustainability of the current growth trend, and also lead to undesirable income distribution 
consequences, because the majority of workers with just primary education will continue to fall further and 
further behind those with better education. Policies are needed to increase secondary enrollm ent in a way that 
will not impose too much burden on those who are already poor, and also to develop effective training 
program s to upgrade the skills of those with just primary education who are no longer in the formal education 
system.
3. At the higher education level, the education system needs to be m ade m ore flexible to respond 
better to the skill requirem ents from the labour market. Fields of study which produce excess supply of workers 
need to  be trimmed, while those with shortages need to be allocated more resources to expand. Private 
universities and colleges need to be given more flexibility, and more cooperation are needed between the public 
sector and the private sector to develop programs of study that will meet with requirem ents in the labour 
m arket. The future is one where the public supply of education (which will continue to be the dominant source 
of supply for sometime) need to cater to requirem ents for employment in the private sector, rather than mostly 
to employment in the public sector as in the past.
18. This will be true in agriculture also, where there are now diversifications into more higher value added products, such as fruits, 
vegetable, and aqua-culture. These products generally require more skill and knowledge to get the best results.
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